THE PICO BLOCK CIPHER
The design of PICO cipher is based on a substitution permutation network 5 . It has a total of 32 rounds. PICO cipher supports 64 bit plaintext and 128 bit key length. Figure 1 shows the block diagram of PICO cipher.
Plaintext bits/cipher text bits are arranged in 4 X 16 array format as shown in Fig. 2 16 , and so on, as shown in Fig. 2 
Add_round_key
Add_round_key performs an XOR operation with 64 bit current state output and 64 bit sub key. Where P → p 
SubColumn
The S-box used in PICO cipher is of 4×4 and illustrated in Table 1 . Substitution operation performed column wise which was previously explained in RECTANGLE cipher 6 .
Permutation_Layer
Permutation layer of PICO cipher is based on bit permutation. The bit permutation used in PICO cipher is depicted by 
Key Schedule of 128-bit Key Length
Key schedule of PICO cipher is motivated from the SPECK cipher key scheduling design 4 . SPECK key scheduling is compact in memory size requirement and no attacks till date are reported on it.
In PICO cipher total 33 subkeys are used each of size 64 bits and these 64 bits are extracted from 128 bit key scheduling algorithm which is mentioned below.
( SubColumn operation is based on the substituting S-box column wise. Operation of SubColumn is illustrated in Fig. 3 Subkeys are arranged in 4×16 array format as shown in Fig. 4 to perform AddRoundKey operation.
Car DC = 2. This is the most important property in designing of S-box. We have achieved Cardinality of 2 in both linear and differential table for the given S-box. This property indicates the strength and robustness of S-box.
For any nonzero input mask 3.
A ∈ F 2 4 and output mask such that B ∈ In the case of PRESENT 6 cipher, S-box has Car DC = 0 and Car LC = 8, while in case of RECTANGLE 6 cipher, S-box has Car DC = 2 and Car LC = 2.
Linear Cryptanalysis
Liner Cryptanalysis 10 is an attack which is applicable on the symmetric-key block ciphers. This attack is the known plaintext attack. High probability occurrences of linear expression containing plaintext bits, cipher text bits and subkey bits are used for mounting the linear attack on cipher. Linear attack is mounted by having the knowledge about a subset of plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext. An attacker tries to find the correlation between them. S-box is examined by forming linear approximation table (LAT). Bias (ε) can be given as |P L -1/2| where P L represents the linear probability. Maximum bias value for PICO cipher is 2 -2 . Optimising the bias in LAT and increase the number of active S-boxes in cipher structure provides robustness for the linear attack.
PICO has minimum 11 active S-box for 6 rounds. By applying Matsui`s Pilling up Lemma 10 total bias for 24 rounds is 2 -45 . The complexity of linear attack is 1/ (2 -45 ) 2 = 2
90
. Hence the complete rounds of PICO cipher shows good resistance against a linear attack.
Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis 11, 12 is an attack which is applicable to symmetric key block cipher. Differential cryptanalysis firstly applied on DES
11
. Pair of high probability input and output occurrences are used to mount this attack. Substitution layer is a nonlinear layer in design, which is examined by forming difference distribution table (DDT). P D represents differential probability, P D value for PICO S-box is 4/16 = 1/4 = 2 -2 . Minimize the differential probability (P D ) and build a cipher design such that it maximises the minimum number of active S-boxes provide resistance against differential attack.
There are 12 active S-boxes for 6 rounds of PICO cipher. Differential probability for 24 rounds of the cipher is 
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PICO
Various cryptanalysis techniques are applied on a cipher to find the robustness of cipher. S-box is a nonlinear layer in cipher design and it plays a very important role to provide security against well-known attacks like linear attack and differential attack.
Computer based techniques are used in this paper for selection of good S-box and to calculate the minimum number of active S-boxes.
Design Criteria of the S-box
Gate count is increased by using separate S-box in each round of cipher and similarly it does not provide sensible amount of improvement in the resistance against known attacks 7 . We have chosen 4×4 S-box in our design of PICO cipher. S-box used in the PICO cipher is robust and prevents clustering of linear and differential trails. One of the most important aspect in PICO cipher design is the nonlinear robust layer S-box.
4×4 S-box provides compactness and the selection of proper S-box provides resistance against linear and differential attack. We have considered these two parameters while designing the S-box.
PICO S-box is S: F 2 4 ← F 2 4, it means that it takes a 4 bit input and produces a 4 bit output. Important properties for a good S-box design are mentioned which has been considered for the S-box selection.
Complete design criteria of the S-box which we have used in designing of the PICO cipher is given as follows, For any nonzero input difference 1.
△A ∈ F 2 4 and output differences △B ∈ F 2 4 , respectively we have, Since the ∆i-differential affects the 48 bits of the ciphertext as illustrated from Fig. 5 . The data complexity does not exceed than 2 48 . The total key recovery complexity of PICO-128 is C total = 2 127.717 . 
Algebraic Attack
Attacker applies the algebraic attack 15 more usually on stream cipher rather than applying it on block cipher. The 4 × 4 bit S-box is described by minimum 21 quadratic equations in the 8 input /output variables, Let x = a × 21 are the quadratic equations and in that y = a × 8 are the variables used to examine the complete cipher. Where a represents the number of S-boxes used in encryption algorithm and in key scheduling algorithm. For 32 rounds of cipher, there are a total 512 S-boxes in the encryption design. PICO cipher has the 10752 number of quadratic equations in 4096 variables, these many equations provides good resistance against the algebraic attack.
Avalanche Effect 16
When a single bit change in the input changes the output significantly, this results in an avalanche effect. For example by flipping a single bit in the input or in a key could change the half of the bits in cipher text. Cipher with good avalanche effect has higher probability to resist all possible types of attacks. The poor randomisation occurs when a block cipher does not show the avalanche effect to a significant degree. Table 3 shows some examples of avalanche effect.
SECURITY COMPARISON WITH STANDARD ALGORITHM
In this section we have compared the security analysis of PICO with the other standard lightweight ciphers. The [13] comparison is represented in Table 4 and 5. Table 4 compares the linear complexity and differential complexity by considering the number of active S-boxes for the particular rounds. Table 6 compares the S-box design considerations with the lightweight ciphers. PICO S-box has CAR DC =2 and CAR LC =2 which illustrate that PICO cipher S-box is robust in design and provides good security than other lightweight ciphers.
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE OF PICO CIPHER
Design of a PICO cipher provides optimum performance in Table 5 compares the data complexity and computational complexity of PICO cipher with the other ciphers. 0.18 µ logic process (UMCL18G212T3) 18 . GEs calculation for PICO cipher is represented in Table 7 . For 128 bit key scheduling PICO cipher needs 1877 GEs. hardware as well as on software platform. We have considered the 32 bit ARM 7 LPC2129 processor for analysing software performance of PICO cipher 17 . Footprint area, i.e. GEs are computed with standard cell library based on UMCL 180 0.18 µ logic process (UMCL18G212T3) 18 . Memory size required for PICO cipher on 32 bit processor is 2504 bytes as Flash memory and 1256 as RAM memory. All other ciphers are written in embedded C and implemented on a 32 bit processor for comparison with the PICO cipher. Fig. 6 represents the memory comparison of the existing lightweight ciphers with PICO cipher. PICO needs less memory as compared to the other S-P network light weight ciphers. Datapath for the PICO cipher is shown in Fig. 7 .
Area is computed with standard cell library UMCL 180 We have calculated the power consumption by using X-power analyser tool available in ISE design suit 14.2. Power is calculated with 10 MHz frequency and on VIRTEX VI family. PICO Cipher consumes 28mW of power while PRESENT and RECTANGLE cipher consumes 38 mW and 31 mW, respectively. PICO cipher consumes 26 per cent less power as compared to the PRESENT cipher. Power consumption mentioned in Table 8 .
PICO results in consuming less GEs as compared to all the other existing lightweight cipher represented in Fig. 8 . Table 9 shows the comparison of lightweight ciphers with PICO based on parameters like execution time, throughput and number of cycles required to convert plain text to cipher text. Throughput is computed on a software platform at 12 MHz.
Test Vectors
Plain text: 0000 0000 0000 0000 Key: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Cipher text: fda7e7de58c913f4 Plain text: 0123 4567 89ab cdef Key: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 Cipher text: 8ebcf6ffd7289163
CONCLUSION
A PICO, an ultra-lightweight and low power cipher design is presented. PICO cipher design results in lesser foot print area and lower power consumption. PICO performs efficiently both on the hardware and the software platforms. The resistance of PICO cipher against well-known attacks as shown. PICO cipher has a very strong S-box and a robust permutation layer which prevents the cipher design from undergoing the clustering of linear and differential trails. In designing a PICO cipher, A small gate count as well as small power dissipation so that it can be implemented for security in any small scale embedded system is achieved. PICO needs less footprint area and less power consumption as compared to PRESENT, LED and other ciphers. For applications like RFID tags, Wireless sensor nodes, where small footprint area and power consumption play a crucial role, we believe the PICO cipher is one of the best suited designs. In current study, he has contributed to the implementation of advance attacks and power calculations.
